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In a three-sector general equilibrium model we examine the impact of a partial tax on labour on skilled-
unskilled wage inequality. We find that a tax on labour in industrial sector increases skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality in the short-run, and can have the opposite effect in the long-run. A tax on labour in the services sector 
reduces skilled-unskilled wage inequality in both the short-run and long-run. Furthermore, introduction of a tax on 
labour in agricultural sector has no effect on the skilled wage, but reduces the unskilled wage. Accordingly, such a 
tax increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in both the short-run and long-run. 
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Economic restructuring, technological progress and an increase in the pace of 
globalisation has resulted in economic growth in a number of economies, notably Brazil, China 
and India. While there is a general improvement in the standard of living, not all groups within 
each country have equally benefitted. Rising wage inequality has been identified as a major 
concern (e.g., see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993). 
A number of studies have attempted to identify the determinants of skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality.
1
 Early studies focused on the role of skill-biased technological progress and 
trade liberalisation. It has been argued that technological progress and worker skills are 
complementary and hence improvement in technology has resulted in a relatively large increase 
in the skilled wage, thereby increasing skilled-unskilled wage inequality (Acemoglu, 2002; 
Epifani and Gancia, 2008). Within the context of perfectly competitive market structure, trade 
liberalisation can also contribute to wage inequality when, for example, at least one factor of 
production is sector specific or workers are heterogeneous (Kumar and Mishra, 2008). Other 
studies, such as Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007), argue that labour market imperfections can also 
explain the rise in skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Beladi, Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2008), 
among others, focus on the role of international factor mobility.  
This paper aims to extend the existing literature on the determinants of skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality in a novel way. Specifically, we examine the impact of a tax on labour in 
different sectors on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Recent studies, such as OECD (2012), 
suggest that too much attention has been paid to absolute wage inequality and factors like 
taxation and employment status (part time versus full time) have not received adequate attention. 
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While some studies in the area of public finance (for example McLure, 1971) have highlighted 
the role of sector specific factors, none of the available studies has considered the link between a 
partial tax on labour and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Using a three-sector general 
equilibrium model involving an industrial good, an agricultural good and a large number of 
varieties of producer services, this paper shows that a tax on labour in the industrial sector can 
increase skilled-unskilled wage inequality. However, a tax on labour in producer services sector 
reduces skilled-unskilled wage inequality. This paper also distinguishes between short-run and 
long-run effect of a partial tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. A brief of review of related literature is 
provided in section 2. Following the existing literature, a three-sector general equilibrium model 
involving monopolistic competition is specified in section 3. The model is used to consider the 
impact of the introduction of a tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the short-run 
and the long-run in section 4. The last section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Review of the related literature 
A large number of studies have examined various aspects of skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality. These studies can be divided into three broad categories: (i) studies that highlight the 
role of skill-biased technological progress, (ii) studies that focus on the role of trade 
liberalisation and factor mobility, and (iii) studies that focus on the role of institutional quality 
and other factors. The rest of this section contains a brief review of some recent studies that 
belong to each of these three strands of existing literature on skilled-unskilled wage inequality.
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2.1 Technological progress and wage inequality 
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 A review of recent studies concerning the impact of skill-biased technological progress and factor mobility on 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality can be found in Zhang (2015). 
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A number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the link between 
technological improvement and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. A large body of this literature 
is summarised by Card and DiNardo (2002). They suggest that an increase in the use of 
microcomputers from the late 1980s led to increase in worker productivity in the US. As skilled 
workers make a greater use of computers, there was a relatively larger increase in skilled wages. 
A number of empirical studies reviewed by Card and DiNardo highlight different aspects of the 
link between technology and wage inequality in US and other countries. Lemieux (2006) finds 
that an increase in worker education and experience can account for rising wage inequality in the 
US. The empirical work of Ábrahám (2008), based on data from the US, appears to suggests that 
the observed increase in skilled-unskilled wage inequality could be attributed to a relatively slow 
increase in the supply of educated workers. Using a calibrated vintage capital model with 
heterogeneous labour, Marquis, Trehan and Tantivong (2014) suggest that skill-biased 
technological progress explains only a small proportion of the increase in skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality in US. They argue that a shift in the distribution of human capital across skilled and 
unskilled workers can account for a large proportion of observed increase in skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality in US. 
 
2.2 Trade liberalisation and wage inequality 
In a recent review of trade and wage inequality literature, Kurokawa (2014) suggests that 
an increase in international trade has contributed to increase in skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
in the US and Mexico. Kurokawa argues that trade based explanations of wage inequality are not 
entirely satisfactory. For example, trade based theories fail to explain the observed decrease in 
the price of goods produced by skilled workers, which is inconsistent with a relatively large 
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increase in the skilled wage rate. This has resulted in an examination of the role of some related 
factors. For example, the theoretical work of Oladi, Gilbert and Beladi (2011) shows that foreign 
direct investment can increase the skilled-unskilled wage inequality3. Empirical studies that 
consider the impact of foreign investment on wage inequality include Taylor and Driffield 
(2005), Chen, Ge, and Lai (2011) and Anwar and Sun (2012). Using firm level data, Taylor and 
Driffield (2005) argue that foreign direct investment can account for approximately 11% of wage 
inequality in the UK. Anwar and Sun (2012), using firm level panel data from China’s 
manufacturing sector, find that trade liberalisation and foreign investment can affect skilled-
unskilled wage inequality. Chen, Ge and Lai (2011) argue that foreign investment in China has 
contributed to a decline in wages paid by some domestic firms but, generally speaking, foreign-
invested firms pay higher wages and hence foreign investment has contributed to a rise in wage 
inequality in China.  
Using a theoretical model, where job creation is endogenous, Ranjan (2012) suggests that 
the impact of trade on wage inequality cannot be unambiguously determined. While taking firm 
heterogeneity and task outsourcing into account, Bakhtiari (2012) shows that, under certain 
conditions, trade can affect the skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Using a sector specific model, 
Barua and Pant (2014) consider the impact of trade liberalisation on wage inequality in 
developing countries. Their analysis based on a sector specific model with full employment 
suggest that, as compared to free trade, labour productivity makes a relatively strong contribution 
to skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Barua and Pant further argue that, when labour is not fully 
employed in the production of a sector specific non-traded intermediate good, trade can 
contribute to skilled-unskilled wage inequality. While summarising the exiting literature, 
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 In addition to foreign direct investment, migration of labour is also found to affect the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality, for example Kar and Beladi (2004) and Marjit and Kar (2005). 
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Akerman et al. (2013) suggest that the impact of trade liberalisation on productivity of all firms 
is not uniform, which gives rise to wage inequality as export oriented firms can pay higher 
wages. In a recent empirical study, Cali (2014) finds that, contrary to the predictions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, an increase in international trade contributed to a decrease in skilled-
unskilled wage inequality in Uganda.4 However, expansion of domestic trade has accounted for a 
rise in skilled-unskilled wage inequality in districts of Uganda.  
 
2.3 Institutional and other factors 
 
As indicted earlier, while previous studies on the determinants of skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality focus on the role of skilled-biased technological progress and trade, recent studies 
highlight other factors. For example, Anwar (2009) and Beladi and Chao (2010) focus on the 
link between downsizing and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Mandal and Marjit (2010) 
investigate the role of corruption. Pi and Zhou (2013) consider the role of institutional quality, 
whereas Anwar (2008), Dutta and Gupta (2012) and Pi and Zhou (2014) show that provision of 
public infrastructure can affect skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Akerman et al. (2013) suggest 
that labour market frictions and firm heterogeneity can also explain the increase in skilled-
unskilled wage inequality. The theoretical work of Anwar (2013) suggests a relationship between 
outsourcing and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. The empirical work of Chongvilaivan and 
Thangavelu (2012) focuses on the link between outsourcing and wage inequality in Thailand. Li 
and Zhou (2013) suggest that remittances of unskilled workers can contribute to skilled-unskilled 
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 The empirical work of Mehta and Hassan (2012) suggests that trade liberalisation has contributed to an increase in 




wage inequality in developing countries. Pan and Zhou (2013) consider the role of environmental 




3. A three sector model 
Consider a small open economy that produces an exportable industrial good (Y) and an 
importable agricultural good (Z). Skilled labour, capital and varieties of producer services  ix
enter into the production of the industrial good. Varieties of producer services are produced by 
means of skilled labour and capital, whereas the importable agricultural good is produced by 
unskilled labour and capital. Furthermore, varieties of producer services are internationally 
traded. It is well known that the pattern of intra-industry trade is indeterminate, but a country will 
be either a net-exporter or net-importer of varieties of producer services.
6
 The production 
function for the exportable good is as follows: 
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where ysL and yK respectively are skilled labour and capital used in the production of the 
industrial good; ix is the ith variety of producer services used in the production of the industrial 
good; n is the number of varieties produced; , , and  are positive but less than 1; and 
 
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 Other related studies include Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit, S. (2010), Blum (2008) and Breau and Rigby (2010). 
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The services sector produces a large number of varieties. The cost function for the ith 
variety of producer services is as follows:
7
  
    
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    

    
where sw and r respectively are the skilled wage and the reward for capital; xt is the tax on skilled 
labour in the services sector and  is positive but less than 1.
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The production function for good Z , which uses unskilled labour and capital, is as 
follows: 
(1 )
zu zZ L K
    
where zuL and zK respectively are the unskilled labour and capital used in the production of Z ;  











Following the existing literature, for example Anwar (2010), Zhang (2012 & 2013) and 
Gupta and Dutta (2012), this paper focuses on a symmetric equilibrium where all varieties of 
producer services are equally priced. As the production of each variety is subject to internal 
economies of scale, and producer services varieties enter as input into the production of the 
industrial goodY , the production of Y is subject to external economies of scale. This implies 
that an increase in the number of varieties reduces the effective price of each variety. The zero 
profit condition that determines the equilibrium output ofY under perfect competition is as 
follows: 




















                                               (1)        
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 A similar cost function has been used by, among others, Anwar (2013) and Zhang (2012 & 2013).   
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where p is the relative price of producer services varieties and yt is the tax on labour in the 
industrial good sector.  
The right-hand side of equation (1) is the marginal cost, whereas the left-hand side is the 
price of ,Y  which has been normalised to equal unity. Due to the presence of international 
economies, each variety of producer services is produced under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. Equation (2) determines the equilibrium output of each variety as follows:  
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                                               (2) 
 The right-hand side of equation (2) is the marginal cost of production, whereas the left 
hand-side is marginal revenue. The final good Z is produced under perfectly competitive 
conditions and its equilibrium output is determined by equation (3) as follows: 
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1 z uq t w r
  
                                                     (3)
 
where zt is the tax on unskilled wage; uw and q respectively are the unskilled wage and the 
relative price of .Z  
The market clearing level of the skilled wage is determined by the interaction of demand 
and supply as follows:  












     

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 

                             (4)
 
where sL is the supply of skilled labour, which is fixed.
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 Equilibrium conditions (1) to (3) have been used to derive simplified versions of all market clearing conditions, i.e., 
equations (4) to (6). 
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Equation (4) shows that skilled labour is used only in the production of Y and varieties of 
producer services. The first term on the left hand side of equation (4) is demand for labour in the 
industrial good sector and the second term is demand for labour in producer services sector. 
 Unskilled labour is used only in the production of Z and the market clearing condition is 
as follows: 













                                                  (5) 
where uL is the supply of unskilled labour, which is fixed.
 
Capital is used in all sectors and the relevant market clearing condition is as follows:
 
                                             
   1 Y n x p qZ
K
r r r
     

 
                                      (6) 
where K is the supply of capital, which is fixed. 
 Equation (6) determines the equilibrium reward for capital. The first and the second terms 
on the left hand side of equation (6) are demand for labour in the exportable good and producer 
services sectors, whereas the third term is demand for labour in the agricultural sector.  
Short-run equilibrium involves a situation where the number of varieties produced (i.e., 
the number of firms in the producer services sector) is exogenous and the equilibrium price is 
determined in the international market. Accordingly, the equilibrium is characterised by 
equations (1) to (6). There are six equations with six endogenous variables: x, r, ws, wu, Z and Y. 
Equations (1) to (6) can be used to investigate the impact of a partial tax on labour on  skilled-
unskilled wage inequality. 
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The long-run equilibrium is characterised by free entry and exit of firms, which implies 
that each firm within the producer services sector produces a single variety and earns zero 
economic profit. The following condition ensures zero economic profit. 
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 Equation (7) also determines the optimal number of varieties produced (i.e., n ). Because 
the economy under consideration is small and varieties of producer services are internationally 
traded, the equilibrium price p is determined in the international market. Accordingly the long-
run equilibrium where producer services are internationally traded involves seven equations in 
seven endogenous variables: n, x, r, ws, wu, Z and Y. Equations (1) to (7) can be used to 
investigate the impact of a partial tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the long-
run. 
 
4. The impact of a partial tax on labour and skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
The main purpose of this section is to investigate the impact of a partial tax on labour on 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. This task is accomplished by making use of the models that 








 and the tax rates
 yi.e., ,  and .x zt t t  
4.1 Impact of a tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the long-run 
Given that p is exogenous, equations (2) and (3) can be used to derive the following 
relationship.                 
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, etc.  
Equation (8) shows that introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector affects the 
skilled-unskilled wage through its impact on the price of capital. However, introduction of a tax 
on the producer services sector and the agricultural sector affects skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality directly as well as indirectly through its effect on the price of capital. 
The impact of the introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector on skilled-
unskilled wage inequality can be examined by means of equation (9) as follows: 
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The results presented in this paper depend on relative factor intensities. In the rest of this 
paper, we assume that that the industrial good is capital intensive relative to producer services 
and producer services are capital intensive relative to the agricultural good. In other words, we 
assume that 





                                                    (10) 
Using the properties of cost functions, it can be confirmed that 
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The above relationships imply that is negative, which in turn implies that the impact of 
the introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector on skilled-unskilled wage inequality, as 
shown by equation (9) cannot be unambiguously determined. However, if the size of external 








is sufficiently large then the introduction of 
a tax on labour can decrease skilled-unskilled wage inequality. But, if the impact of external 
economies arising from the use of producer services in the industrial sector is sufficiently small 
then the introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector increases skilled-unskilled wage 






 the introduction of a tax on skilled labour in the industrial sector increases 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector, as 
shown in equation (11), increases the number of varieties of producer services, which enhances 
the productivity of skilled labour as well as capital in the industrial sector. The introduction of a 
tax on labour in the industrial sector encourages substitution of capital for skilled labour which 
contributes to an increase in both the skilled and the unskilled wage rates. However, there is a 
larger increase in the skilled wage rate. 
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                
         (11) 
 The above discussion yields the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1: Introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector can decrease skilled-
unskilled wage inequality in the long-run, if the size of external economies in the industrial 
sector is sufficiently large. 
 The impact of a tax on labour in the producer services sector on skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality can be examined by means of equation (12) as follows: 
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         (12) 
 Equation (12) shows that introduction of a tax on labour in the producer services sector 
leads to an unambiguous decrease in skilled-unskilled wage inequality. However, its effect on 
the number of varieties of producer services produced as shown by equation (13) is not 
unambiguous. 
            
            
         
1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ
ˆ 1 1 1 1 1
z y y s
x
x x y
K K L K Ln
t nL K
       
      
                                 
     (13) 
Introduction of a tax on labour in the services sector leads to substitution of capital for 
skilled labour. As the services sector is relatively skilled labour intensive, a large number of 
workers are released, which tends to reduce the skilled wage rate. On the other hand, there is 
upwards pressure on the price of capital, which leads to an outflow of capital from the 
agricultural sector.  This out flow of capital from the agricultural sector puts upward pressure on 
the unskilled wage rate thereby decreasing the skilled unskilled-wage inequality. The theoretical 




Proposition 2: Given the assumptions concerning relative factor intensities, irrespective of the 
size of external economies in the industrial sector, a tax on labour in producer services sector 
decreases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the long-run. 
So far we have considered the impact of a tax on labour in the industrial and the producer 
services sectors on skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the long-run. Introduction of a tax on 
agricultural sector has no effect on the skilled wage rate but it reduces the unskilled wage rate 
thereby increasing skilled unskilled wage inequality. This yields proposition 3 as follows. 
Proposition 3: Irrespective of the size of external economies in industrial sector, a tax on labour 
in the agricultural sector increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the long-run. 
Proposition 3 follows from the fact that unskilled labour is specific to the agricultural 
sector, whereas the skilled labour is mobile across producer services and industrial sectors. The 
impact of a partial tax on labour on skilled-unskilled inequality in the short-run is discussed in 
section 3.2. 
3.2 Impact of a tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the short-run 
The short-run impact of a partial tax on labour on skilled-unskilled wage inequality can 
be investigated by differentiating equilibrium conditions (1) to (6) with respect to the relevant tax 
rates. As a first step, given that both p and n are exogenous, using equations (1) to (3), the 
following relationship can be derived.
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     (14) 
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Equation (14) shows that, in the short-run, introduction of a partial tax on labour affects 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality both directly as well as indirectly (through its effect on the 
price of capital). The impact of a tax on skilled labour in the industrial sector on wage inequality 
in the short-run can be examined by means of equation (15) as follows: 
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                 (15)
 
Introduction of a tax on labour in industrial sector leads to an increase in both skilled and 
unskilled wage rate. The unskilled wage increases due to outflow of capital from agricultural 
sector. However, increase in the skilled wage is larger than the increase in unskilled wage, which 
yields proposition 4 as follows. 
Proposition 4: Given the assumptions concerning relative factor intensities, a tax on labour in 
the industrial sector increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the short-run. 
Equation (16) shows the short-run impact of a tax on labour in the producer services 
sector on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. 
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The result presented in equation (16) can be summarised by a proposition as follows. 
Proposition 5: Given the assumptions concerning relative factor intensities, a tax on labour in 
the producer services sector decreases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the short-run. 
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 Proposition (5) follows from the fact that the introduction of such a tax decreases both the 
skilled and the unskilled wage rates. However, as the services sector is relatively labour intensive, 
the introduction of a tax on labour in this sector leads to a relatively larger decrease in the skilled 
wage rate thereby decreasing the skilled-unskilled wage inequality.  
Proposition 6: A tax on labour in the agricultural increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality in 
the short-run. 
Finally the introduction of a tax on labour in agricultural sector increases the skilled-




A number of existing theoretical studies have attempted to identify the determinants of 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Early studies highlight the role of skill-biased technological 
progress and trade liberalisation. Recent studies consider the role of, among other things, 
corruption, international outsourcing and provision of public infrastructure. This paper focuses 
on the role of a partial tax on labour, which has not been considered by any of the available 
studies. Using a three sector general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition, this 
paper shows that introduction of a tax on labour in each of the three sectors can have a different 
effect on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. The three sectors considered in this paper are: an 
industrial sector, an agricultural sector and a services sector. The industrial sector utilises skilled 
labour, capital and a large number of varieties of producer services. Varieties of producer 
                                                          
10
 By making use of equations (1) to (6), it can be easily confirmed that if labour is uniformly taxed across all sectors 
then there will be no impact on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. 
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services are produced by means of skilled labour and capital. Due to the presence of internal 
economies of scale, monopolistic competition prevails in the services sector, which gives rise to 
external economies in the industrial sector. The agricultural sector utilises unskilled labour and 
capital. All goods are traded and the industrial sector is more capital intensive relative to the 
services sector, which in turn is more capital intensive relative to the agricultural sector. The 
theoretical set-up used in this paper also allows one to distinguish between the long-run and 
short-run effects. 
The theoretical analysis presented in this paper suggests that, in the short-run, 
introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality. 
On the other hand, introduction of a tax on labour in the services sector reduces skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality. In the long-run, the presence of external economies in the industrial sector plays 
a crucial role. Specifically, if the size of external economies arising from internal economies in 
the services sector is sufficiently large, introduction of a tax on labour in the industrial sector can 
decrease skilled-unskilled wage inequality. On the other hand, irrespective of the size of external 
economies in the industrial sector, introduction of a tax on labour in the services sector decreases 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Finally, the introduction of a tax on labour in the agricultural 
sector does not affect the skilled wage but its effect on the unskilled wage is negative, which 
contributes to increase in skilled-unskilled wage inequality in both the short and long-run. 
The results presented in this paper are based on the assumption that all goods are 
internationally traded. It will be interesting to examine the impact of a partial tax on labour in the 
presence of non-traded goods. We plan to address this issue in our future research.11 
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